Abstract:

Wireless networks are vulnerable to surveillance and attack. Even the strongest encryption and authentication are not sufficient to protect the network. Because signal propagates in shared media, the very acts of transmission, easily detectable using simple devices, reveal crucial aspects of networking. If eavesdropping sensors are geographically distributed in the network, a malicious attacker can track the flow of information.

We present in this talk two related problems. The first is the detection of information flow where we address some of the following questions: Can a route be discovered by eavesdropping sensors? What are the fundamental limits of hiding the information flow in a multihop setup? What are the effective ways of detecting information flows when they are
detectable? This problem is also related to the so-called stepping-stone detection. The second problem is on defending eavesdropping via randomized scheduling. Here we are interested in the achievable network flow under secrecy constraints.

 

Biography of the Speaker :

Professor Lang Tong is a Chaired Professor at Cornell University's School of ECE and a Fellow of IEEE. His interests are in wireless networks, information theory, statistical signal processing for
wireless systems, security, privacy, and anonymity of networking. Professor Tong is a visitor to the ECE department under a DRDO visitors programme.
 

 

 

 

 

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